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INFORMATION AGGREGATION AND THE COGNITIVE MAKE-UP OF TRADERS
Brice Corgnet*
Mark DeSantis**
David Porter**

Abstract
We assess the effect of the cognitive make-up of traders on the informational efficiency of markets.
We put forth that cognitive skills, such as cognitive reflection, are crucial for ensuring the
informational efficiency of markets because they endow traders with the ability to infer others’
information from prices. Using laboratory experiments, we show that information aggregation is
significantly enhanced when (i) all traders possess high levels of cognitive sophistication and (ii) this
high level of cognitive sophistication is common information for all traders. Our findings shed light
on the cognitive and informational constraints underlying the efficient market hypothesis.
Keywords: Information aggregation, market efficiency, cognitive skills, cognitive finance,
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1. Information Aggregation in Experimental Asset Markets
The extent to which markets aggregate disperse information has been at the center of the heated debate
on market efficiency in Finance (Fama, 1970; Shleifer, 2000; Thaler, 2005; Fama, 2008; Shiller,
2015). The empirical assessment of market efficiency is a daunting task because not only is it
impossible for researchers to observe traders’ private information, but it is also impossible to test
market efficiency independent of a specific equilibrium model for asset prices (see, for example, Fama
1991).
An alternative approach to the archival studies of financial time series is to use experimental asset
markets to assess information aggregation, which measures the market’s ability to consolidate
disperse information into clear price signals regarding the asset’s true value. In this setting, the
researcher not only has control over the distribution of private information but also knows the
fundamental value of the traded asset. It follows that in an experimental asset market, informational
efficiency can be tested separately from asset pricing models. This promising approach was pioneered
by Plott and Sunder (1988) (PS, henceforth), who designed a laboratory environment to study
information aggregation. We use one of their specific designs to analyze further the market’s ability
to aggregate disperse information by identifying the critical condition(s) under which aggregation
occurs. This design introduces an experimental asset that can only assume one of three possible values,
50, 240 or 490. Each trader in the market is then informed of a possible value the asset cannot take.
As half of the traders are given one signal (e.g., “Not 50”) and the other half are given the other
possible signal (e.g., “Not 240”), the aggregate information available to all traders in the market is
complete. If markets aggregate information, then trading should only occur at the true asset value
(e.g., 490). This prediction implies perfect information aggregation in the spirit of Fama’s (1970)
definition of strong-form efficiency according to which all private information should ultimately be
incorporated into prices.
2

In PS, strong-form efficiency was motivated by the existence of a fully-revealing rational
expectations equilibrium in which subjects’ beliefs regarding the true asset value coincide with the
true asset value. However, as first suggested by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), this fully-revealing
rational expectations equilibrium may not be attainable. Indeed, if all traders know that prices are fully
revealing, they will not engage in the costly acquisition of information, which will prevent any
aggregation of private information. In our experimental setup, private information is given to traders
for free, thus somehow alleviating Grossman-Stiglitz concerns. Nevertheless, if we take into account
any cognitive costs associated with trading based on information, then the reasoning of Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) implies that fully-revealing prices might not be achieved.
Despite the findings of PS showing evidence in favor of strong-form efficiency, several recent
experimental studies, using various institutional designs, have cast doubt on the market’s ability to
aggregate dispersed private information (see, e.g., Biais et al. 2005; Hanson, Oprea and Porter 2006;
Veiga and Vorsatz 2010; Huber, Angerer and Kirchler, 2011; Page and Siemroth, 2017; Corgnet et
al. 2018; Page and Siemroth, 2018; Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2019).
Limitations to the aggregation of private information have also been evidenced in the herding
literature (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992; Guarino, Harmgart and Huck,
2011), which shows that individuals making sequential decisions might rationally ignore their own
private information to follow the majority’s decision. When considering a financial setting in which
a market maker sets quotes, Cipriani and Guarino (2005; 2009) provide experimental evidence
supporting the theoretical prediction that herding would only occur in the presence of
multidimensional uncertainty (Avery and Zemsky, 1998).
By contrast with previous market design research focusing on the institutional (e.g., PS; O’Brien
and Srivastava, 1991) and informational features (Copeland and Friedman, 1987; Camerer and
Weigelt 1991; Nöth and Weber, 2003; Plott, Wit and Yang, 2003; Barner, Feri and Plott, 2005) of
3

markets, we study the impact of the cognitive make-up of traders on the aggregation of private
information. Our approach is motivated by the observation that any fully-revealing rational
expectations model crucially hinges upon traders’ ability to unambiguously infer others’ information
from market orders (e.g., Guesnerie, 2005).1 Given the extensive literature in cognitive psychology
(e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, 2011) documenting the failures of individuals
(including experts) to apply Bayesian inference adequately, the rationality assumption may have to be
reassessed in the light of behavioral finance models (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998,
2001; Hong and Stein, 1999; Shleifer, 2000; Hirshleifer, 2001; Kogan, 2009).
Following the work of Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2018) (henceforth, CDP), we highlight the
crucial role of cognitive skills, which we assess using the cognitive reflection test (CRT, henceforth),
for predicting one’s ability to infer others’ information from prices. The CRT has been shown to be
an accurate measurement of standard cognitive skills (Frederick, 2005).2 CRT questions are also
commonly asked in Wall Street interviews for trading positions (Zhou, 2008; Crack, 2014), and not
surprisingly, professional traders earn high scores on the CRT (Thoma et al. 2015).
We considered two hypotheses, which we subsequently tested with experimental asset markets.
Both hypotheses focus on the cognitive sophistication of the traders in the market. We refer to traders
with high cognitive skills as sophisticated.3 Our first hypothesis suggests that a higher proportion of
sophisticated traders in the market will improve information aggregation. This is the case because
sophisticated traders, unlike non-sophisticated traders, can infer others’ private information from
market orders and thus learn the true asset value over the course of the market. Importantly, the ability

We define the term “market order” to include bids, asks, and prices. We do not use it to differentiate between
immediately executable orders and limit orders.
2
Cognitive reflection scores positively correlate both with standard intelligence tests scores as well as with one’s need
for cognition (see Frederick, 2005; Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016) which is defined as a person’s tendency to enjoy
and engage in effortful thought (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982).
3
In CDP (non-) sophisticated traders were referred to as (non-) reflective traders. Here we use the term sophisticated
to emphasize the notion that we are using cognitive reflection as a proxy for cognitive sophistication.
1
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of sophisticated traders to learn the true asset value relies upon their knowledge of the proportion of
sophisticated traders populating the market. For example, if sophisticated traders wrongly believe that
a large proportion of subjects are making trading decisions based solely on their private information,
then they will downplay the informational content of asset prices, which will limit the degree of
information aggregation in the market. Furthermore, sophisticated traders will only be able to
correctly extract private information from market orders when the proportion of sophisticated traders
is commonly known by all sophisticated traders. Our second hypothesis thus posits that information
aggregation can only be successful if the high level of traders’ cognitive sophistication is common
information.4 This second hypothesis emphasizes that the conditions for information aggregation are
especially restrictive.
We tested our two hypotheses by recruiting sophisticated subjects, which we define as those
individuals whose CRT score, i.e. the number of correctly answered questions, ranked in the top 20%
of all scores in the subject pool of the lab at which the study was conducted. These subjects were
highly sophisticated, as evidenced by the fact that their average CRT scores were similar to those of
professional traders (see Thoma et al. 2015). We compared the results of experiments which were
conducted with solely sophisticated traders to baseline experiments in which we did not utilize the
CRT score as a recruitment criterion. Consistent with our first hypothesis, we show that the
recruitment of sophisticated individuals (without informing them of their fellow traders’ high level of
cognitive sophistication) led to asset prices that were closer to the true asset value than in our baseline
sessions.

4

We state our hypothesis in terms of common information rather than common knowledge because of the impossibility
to convincingly induce common knowledge in our market experiments. Instead, we will induce common information of
the proportion of sophisticated traders by informing all subjects in the experiment of other traders’ levels of cognitive
sophistication.
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In line with our second hypothesis, information aggregation was significantly enhanced (i.e., prices
significantly closer to the true asset value) when the highly sophisticated traders populating the market
were aware of each other’s high level of sophistication.
2. Experimental Design
2.1. Asset markets
Our study uses the design of PS and, in particular, their parameterization of Market 9 (Treatment
C). Specifically, this design introduces an experimental asset that can only take three possible values:
50, 240 or 490 francs (each franc was worth $0.001) with probabilities 35%, 45% and 20%,
respectively.5 Each of the twelve traders in the market was privately informed of a possible value the
asset could not take. Moreover, traders were informed that half of the traders were given one signal
(e.g., “Not 50”) and the other half were given the other possible signal (e.g., “Not 240”). Thus, the
aggregate information available to traders in the market was complete so that prices could, in
principle, reflect the true asset value (e.g., 490). The convergence of prices to the true asset value in
this design constitutes the primary evidence of information aggregation in experimental asset markets.
We chose this design as it allows for the study of the aggregation of disperse pieces of private
information and thus requires, unlike markets with insiders (Plott and Sunder, 1982; Corgnet,
DeSantis and Porter, 2019), all traders to infer others’ private information from observing market
orders in order to learn the true asset value.
2.2. Procedures
We conducted a total of 25 sessions with 12 traders in each.6 Each session consisted of 17 markets
with independent draws for the asset value. In the ten baseline sessions, traders were endowed with

The exchange rate was chosen so that average subjects’ earnings for the experiment were similar to average payments
for a three-hour experiment at the lab where the study was conducted (i.e., average subjects’ earnings were $46.45).
6
These traders were inexperienced in that they did not have prior experience in similar laboratory market experiments.
5
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1,200 francs in cash and four shares of the asset at the beginning of each market (baseline sessions).
To test our cognitive sophistication hypotheses, we conducted two high-CRT treatments – one with
common information of traders’ sophistication and the other without common information. Four
sessions of each high-CRT treatment were conducted using the same parameters as the baseline
sessions. We also conducted two robustness treatments. The first of these treatments (Loan) was
intended to ensure that any lack of information aggregation could not easily be explained by liquidity
constraints. In these two sessions, each subject’s cash endowment thus consisted of a 25,000 franc
loan. The second robustness treatment (High Stakes) was designed to ensure that any lack of
information aggregation could not easily be explained by insufficient incentives.7 In these five
additional High Stakes sessions we doubled the average payoffs ($86.3) earned by subjects in the
experiments by endowing them with 2,400 francs and four shares while also doubling the asset values
(see Table 1 for a description of the treatments).
Table 1. Summary of the experimental design.
Number
of
traders

Number
of markets
(market length in
minutes)
-Sessions-

Endowment /
Loan
Francs
(Assets)

Asset values
Francs
(Probabilities)

Trading mechanism

12

17 (5)
- 10 -

1,200
(4)

50, 240, 490
(0.35,0.45,0.20)

Computerized
continuous double
auction

High CRT
(No common
information)

Same

17 (5)
-4-

Same

Same

Same

High CRT
(Common
information)

Same

17 (5)
-4-

Same

Same

Same

Loan

Same

Same

Same

25,000 Loan
(4)
2,400
(4)

Same

High Stakes

17 (5)
-217 (5)
-5-

100, 480, 980
(0.35,0.45,0.20)

Same

Treatment

Baseline

7

This instructions utilized in this treatment were also modified to facilitate readability. Refer to Appendix B for a listing
of the modifications to the original baseline instructions.
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Before the trading phase of each session, subjects completed a training exercise regarding a random
device (a spinning wheel) that represented the probabilistic distribution of the asset value (50, 240 or
490 francs) at the end of each market (see Appendix B). They were also instructed on how to use the
trading software utilized in the experiment and completed a 7-question comprehension quiz on the
mechanics of the market (see Appendix B).
2.3. End-of-session tests
At the end of each session, subjects completed a (computerized) series of tests and a demographic
survey (see Appendix C). Subjects received a $3 payment for the completion of these tests.8 In
particular, we chose to administer the CRT, which has been found to correlate with trading behavior
in related market experiments (see, for example, Noussair, Tucker and Xu, 2014; Corgnet et al. 2015;
CDP; Kocher, Lucks and Schindler, 2018).
3. Cognitive Skills and Information Aggregation
3.1. Hypotheses
Given the findings of Biais et al. (2005) and CDP, the common assumption that all traders are
homogenous and sophisticated (e.g., Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1975) and therefore have the ability to
learn from market orders, is questionable. Instead, we consider the case in which sophisticated as well
as non-sophisticated traders populate markets.
Sophisticated traders who are able to use market orders to update their own beliefs about the true
asset value should ultimately be better informed than the trader who does not learn from market
orders.9 Thus, traders who use market orders to update their beliefs should trade more consistently
with the true asset value than those who disregard market orders as a signal of the true asset value

8
9

As is common practice in the literature, a pay-for-performance incentive scheme was not used for these tests.
This is the case as long as all other traders are not trading randomly.
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(see Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2019 for a model). In particular, CDP show that cognitive skills,
as measured by cognitive reflection, explain a trader’s inclination to trade consistently with the true
asset value, where a consistent trade is one that implies buying (selling) the asset for a price below
(above) the true asset value. We illustrate this finding in Table 2.
Table 2. Trading consistently with the true asset value for all individual-level data across CRT scores.+
CRT scores
0-1
2-3
4-5
6-7
Average
53.6%
56.8%
57.6%
62.1%
Proportion of
consistent trades
Median
50.0%
60.0%
60.0%
70.0%
Proportion of
35.0%
35.0%
20.8%
9.2%
subjects
+

Baseline data were used.

Because traders possessing high cognitive skills are better able to learn the true asset value in
markets with private information than those who do not, they will also tend to obtain higher earnings.
Non-sophisticated traders would typically not learn others’ private information over the course of the
market because they fail to infer others’ signals from market orders. This behavior of nonsophisticated traders is in line with the prior information or Walrasian model (Lintner, 1969),
according to which traders make decisions based solely on their private information. Experimental
evidence for such behavior has also been reported in Kogan (2009) who showed that traders tend to
downplay the informativeness of prices as accurate signals of other traders’ private information.
Individuals’ cognitive reflection is also closely related to their ability to correctly apply Bayes’ rule
and refrain from using simple heuristics. Recent works have shown that CRT is the cognitive test that
best predicts an individual’s capacity to apply Bayes’ rule adequately (Toplak, West and Stanovich,
2011) and avoid known heuristics and behavioral biases (e.g., Cokely and Kelley, 2009; Oechssler,
Roider and Schmitz, 2009; Campitelli and Labollita, 2010; Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011). In
sum, cognitive skills, as measured with CRT, favor accurate Bayesian updating, thus facilitating one’s
inference of other’s information via market orders. We thus posit the following hypothesis.

9

Hypothesis 1. As the proportion of sophisticated traders in the market increases, market prices will
be closer to the true asset value.
The intuition supporting Hypothesis 1 follows from the fact that an increase in the proportion of
sophisticated traders in the market will increase the informational content of market orders.
Sophisticated traders will be able to infer others’ information by observing market orders and will
subsequently trade based on their updated beliefs of the asset value. These subsequent trades will
transmit information to the market, leading prices to reflect the aggregate information. As a result of
this increase in the number of informed orders, asset prices will more likely reflect traders’ available
information.
There exists, however, one issue with this argument. Sophisticated traders will only make use of
market orders as accurate signals of the true asset value if they believe that market orders are set by
sophisticated individuals who trade based on updated information regarding the true asset value. If
sophisticated traders believe that a large proportion of individuals are not trading based on updated
information (non-sophisticated traders), then they will downplay market orders as accurate signals of
the true asset value. This, in turn, will ultimately hinder information aggregation. This leads to our
second hypothesis, which establishes the essential role common information of traders’ cognitive
sophistication (i.e., all traders are informed of the proportion of sophisticated traders in the market)
serves in enabling markets to aggregate information.
Hypothesis 2. In a market populated solely by sophisticated traders, prices will be closest to the true
asset value when the cognitive make-up of traders is common information.
Although Hypothesis 2 focuses on the case in which all traders are sophisticated, our reasoning
can be applied to markets populated by a mix of sophisticated and non-sophisticated traders. Indeed,
as traders know the cognitive make-up of other traders in the market, their inference about others’
private information will be more accurate, thus fostering informational efficiency in markets. For
10

example, if you are the only sophisticated trader in the market but mistakenly believe others are also
sophisticated, you will infer incorrect information from prices, thus lowering the informational
content of your trades and the informational efficiency of the market.
To test our hypotheses regarding the causal effect of traders’ cognitive skills on the informational
efficiency of markets, we need to be able to exogenously manipulate the proportion of sophisticated
traders in the market. We also require a measure of traders’ cognitive skills. As the CRT is a key
determinant of an individual’s capacity to properly use Bayes’ rule, it is an appropriate measure of
a trader’s ability to infer other traders’ information from market orders.10 We thus chose CRT as our
primary measure of cognitive sophistication.11 Consistent with CDP, we define a sophisticated
(non-sophisticated) trader as one who scores in the top (bottom) 20% on the CRT.
Because CRT and standard intelligence test scores exhibit a substantial positive correlation
ranging from 0.2 to 0.4 depending on the study (see Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West and Stanovich,
2011; Corgnet, Hernan and Mateo, 2015; Stanovich, West and Toplak, 2016), it would seem
reasonable to expect similar results when using alternative cognitive tests, such as Raven, instead
of CRT to recruit sophisticated traders.
3.2. Recruiting on CRT
To recruit by CRT scores, we used the results of an extensive survey conducted at our home
institution at the beginning of the academic year in which our experiments were conducted. All of the
subjects registered in the laboratory’s database (n = 1,963) were invited to complete a comprehensive
one-hour survey which included the extended, 7-item CRT developed by Toplak, West and Stanovich

10

Interestingly, CDP show that Raven test scores, which is a common measurement of cognitive sopthistication, do not
correlate with Bayesian updating performance.
11
CDP also show that, on average, high-CRT individuals earn more than low-CRT individuals. This is in line with a
series of experimental works in the experimental asset market literature (Noussair, Tucker and Xu, 2014; Corgnet et al.
2015; Kocher, Lucks and Schindler, 2018) that have shown that high-CRT subjects outperform low-CRT subjects.
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(2014) as well as the Raven test (Raven, 1936) (see Appendix C).12,13 The use of the new CRT items
developed by Toplak, West and Stanovich (2014) was motivated by concerns regarding previous
exposure to Frederick’s (2005) three original questions (see Stieger and Reips, 2016). Note that the
lab survey was the first instance in which CRT scores were collected at the lab where the study was
conducted so that subjects were unlikely to be familiar with the test. This is confirmed by the fact that
the average 3-item CRT score (1.18) of the subjects who participated in the beginning-of-year survey
is remarkably similar to that of the original sample of Frederick (2005) with 3,428 students (1.24). It
is also reassuring that, in the beginning-of-year survey, the correlation coefficient between the 7-item
CRT scores and IQ scores measured using the Raven test (ρ = 0.34, p-value < 0.001) is very similar
to the coefficient estimated in prior studies (see e.g., Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011).14
Using the 7-item CRT, we recruited subjects in the top 20% of the distribution of scores of the 885
students who participated in the survey but not in any prior experimental asset market experiments
similar to the PS design.15 We thus recruited subjects who scored 5, 6 or 7 on the 7-item CRT (see
Table A1 in Appendix A for the distribution of the 7-item CRT scores in the student population). This
subset of our population has an average score of 2.65 on the original 3-item CRT, which places them
in the top 20% of the distribution of the original CRT scores of 3,428 students surveyed in Frederick
(2005). The scores of our high-CRT subjects were significantly higher than the CRT scores of 592
US individual traders who averaged 1.28 (see Krische, 2015) and professional workers in the Finance
and Banking sectors with an average score of 1.62 (see Thoma et al. 2015). The only groups that
match the CRT scores of our top 20% sample are the 102 professional traders surveyed in Thoma et

12

See CDP for a detailed description of the measures used in the survey.
The questions in Frederick’s (2005) original 3-item CRT are a subset of the questions posed in the 7-item CRT of
Toplak, West and Stanovich (2014).
14
The authors report a correlation coefficient between different measures of fluid intelligence and CRT scores. The
correlation coefficient between CRT scores and the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999)
[working memory, Gronwall, 1977] is 0.32 [0.33].
15
Experiments involving only subjects with high cognitive skills have been conducted in a few recent studies (e.g., Gill
and Prowse, 2016; Bosch, Meissner and Bosch-Domenech, 2018).
13
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al. (2015) and the 24 Caltech students who participated in the study of Brocas et al. (2014) (see Figure
1 for a summary of 3-item CRT scores across a wide range of samples).

Figure 1. Average 3-item CRT scores for a wide range of samples.16
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we conducted two treatments: one in which traders were informed that
all market participants scored in the top 20% of the student population (common information
treatment) and one in which they were not informed (no common information treatment). In the
common information treatment, traders were informed that “the people who were recruited for today’s
experiment have all previously taken a cognitive test [which was described in the instructions] and
have all obtained a very high score (in the top 20% of a population of 1,000 students registered at the
lab where the study was conducted)” (see instructions in Appendix B). The difference across

16

Sinayev and Peters (2015) also suggest that the average three-item CRT is below 1 in the general US population (n =
2,703).
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treatments may appear to be particularly subtle. However, research in social psychology has shown
that people are especially attentive to any information on their skills and on their relative standing in
the population (e.g., Festinger, 1954). This suggests our experimental manipulation is likely to be
salient.
The common information treatment is one in which the behavioral type of other traders is revealed
thus facilitating traders’ inference regarding the private information contained in market orders. Our
common information treatment can be seen as a mechanism by which the experimenter ‘injects’
traders with emotional intelligence by facilitating their own understanding of other traders’ strategies.
Emotional intelligence, which consists of the capacity to read other traders’ intentions and is often
referred to as theory of mind (see e.g., Bruguier, Quartz and Bossaerts, 2010; Hefti, Heinke and
Schneider, 2016; Fe and Gill, 2018; Kimbrough, Robalino and Robson, 2017; Bossaerts, Suzuki and
O’Doherty, 2019 for economic applications), has been identified by CDP (along with fluid
intelligence and cognitive reflection) as a key driver of traders’ earnings in information aggregation
experiments. The reason we focus on CRT instead of theory of mind skills in the current study is that
it allows us to separate the effect of common information regarding traders’ cognitive skills on the
informational efficiency of markets from the effect of these cognitive skills. This might not have been
possible if we had selected traders based on theory of mind scores as traders possessing high theory
of mind may have rapidly inferred other traders’ behavioral types even in the absence of common
information of traders’ scores. In that case, the common information and the no common information
treatments would lead to similar levels of informational efficiency.
We conducted four sessions per treatment with a total of 96 subjects.17 As intended, the CRT scores
of the high-CRT sessions were significantly higher than for the baseline sessions (all p-values < 0.001,

17

Given our limited pool of high-CRT subjects (177), our (intended) target number of sessions per treatment was exactly
equal to four.
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Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests, WRS henceforth) (see Table 3). There are no significant differences in
CRT scores between the high-CRT sessions with and without common information (p-value < 0.873,
WRS).
Table 3. 7-item CRT scores by treatment.
Average (median) -Stand. DevTreatment
CRT score
Baseline (n = 120)

3.31 (3.00) -1.86-

High CRT (n = 48)
(No common information)
High CRT (n = 48)
(Common information)

5.70 (6.00) -0.945.72 (6.00) -0.80-

4. Results
We observe graphically in Figure 2 that average prices for the baseline sessions differ
dramatically from the true asset value.18,19 It is also clear from Figure 2 that the high-CRT sessions
led to prices that were closer to the true asset value than the baseline sessions. This observation is in
line with Hypothesis 1. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we observe that average prices are closest to
the true asset value for the high-CRT sessions with common information.20

18

See Appendix D for graphs of average prices for each session separately, including the Loan and High Stakes sessions.
These findings appear at odds with PS who report prices close to the true asset value. However, our work is not a
direct replication of the authors’ findings because it differs in a number of important ways from PS such as the use of
computerized instead of oral auctions. The reader can refer to Corgnet et al. (2019) for a replication study of PS.
20
In addition to Figure 2, we direct the reader to video links showing examples of the differences in information
aggregation across treatments. In the following links, one can replay Market 17 (last market of the experiment where
the true asset value is 490) for one baseline session, one high-CRT session without common information and one highCRT session with common information:
(https://sites.google.com/site/financecognitive/videos).
19

15

Figure 2. Average price per minute over the four high-CRT with common information (solid red lines with
circle markers), the four high-CRT without common information (dotted green lines), and the 10 baseline (solid
blue lines) sessions for each of the 17 markets. The true asset value is denoted at the bottom of each subfigure,
i.e., 50, 240 and 490, and also represented by a solid black horizontal line.

To assess information aggregation, we report the average across sessions of the mean absolute
deviation (MAD) between the price and the true asset value in Table 4.21 For each session, this value
is calculated as:
𝑀𝐴𝐷 ∶= average|𝑝𝑖 − 𝑣|
𝑖

where 𝑖 represents a transaction, 𝑝𝑖 corresponds to the transaction price, and 𝑣 is the true asset value.
Taking our cue from PS, we give information aggregation its “best chance” by considering the last
occurrence of each of the possible asset values: 50, 240 and 490 (i.e., markets 15, 14 and 17,
respectively).

21

The MAD measures per session are detailed in Table A2 in Appendix A.
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In Table 4, we provide support for our hypotheses by reporting the mean absolute deviations with
respect to the true asset value for each treatment. Extending the analyses conducted in PS, we compute
this variable for all transactions, column (1), as well as for the last three transactions, column (2), in
markets 14, 15 and 17.
In line with Hypothesis 1, we show that the mean absolute deviation is significantly smaller in the
high-CRT sessions than in the baseline sessions whether we consider traders’ level of sophistication
to be common information (p-value = 0.005 for all transactions as well as for the last three transactions,
WRS) or not (p-value = 0.005 for all transactions and p-value = 0.157 for the last three transactions,
WRS). These results are confirmed when conducting panel regression analyses using MAD values for
each market in each session of each treatment as the dependent variable (see Tables A3 and A4 in
Appendix A).
Table 4. Comparison of mean absolute deviations by treatment for (1) all
transactions and for (2) the last three transactions in markets 14, 15 and 17.
Mean Absolute Deviation
(1)
(2)
Treatments
All transactions
Last 3 transactions
Baseline
131.28
115.78
High CRT
106.71
90.08
(No common information)
High CRT
59.89
28.28
(Common information)
Loan
216.93
226.67
High Stakes
142.37
121.52
In line with Hypothesis 2, prices are closer to the true asset value in the high-CRT sessions with
common information than in the high-CRT sessions without common information (p-value = 0.043
for the last three transactions and p-value = 0.083 for all transactions, WRS). These non-parametric
tests used only four independent MAD values per treatment. Unsurprisingly, panel regression analyses
which use MAD values for a single market instead of for a single session, report differences between
treatments that are statistically significant at even lower levels (see Table 5).
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Table 5. Mean absolute deviation in the high-CRT sessions.
This table presents the results of linear panel regressions with random effects and robust standard errors (in
parentheses) clustered at the session level. The mean absolute deviation from the true asset value in a market is used
as the dependent variable. All high-CRT sessions are used. The treatment dummy “CRT Common Information” takes
value one if a market belongs to the high-CRT treatment with common information and value zero otherwise.

Dependent Variable

Sample (Markets / Transactions)
Markets 14, 15 & 17
All transactions
(1)

Markets 14, 15 & 17
Last 3 transactions
(2)

All markets
All transactions
(3)

All markets
Last 3 transactions
(4)

Constant

-716.172***
(138.451)

-440.769***
(160.834)

83.400***
(14.049)

97.381***
(12.990)

Treatment Dummy “CRT
Common Information”

-49.320***
(18.105)

-61.806***
(21.026)

-39.417***
(16.226)

-25.009*
(12.896)

True Asset Value

-0.201**
(0.078)

-0.103
(0.068)

0.087*
(0.046)

0.071***
(0.025)

Market Number

57.406***
(10.120)

36.372***
(11.497)

-1.240
(0.900)

-0.500
(1.056)

24

24

136

136

0.676
0.000

0.511
0.001

0.101
0.012

0.047
0.000

MAD

Number of Observations
R²
Prob > χ²

*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level.

We executed two robustness tests. To ensure our results were not due to the particular cash
endowment, we ran two Loan sessions in which traders were given a 25,000 franc loan at the
beginning of each market. The loan was repaid at the end of each market. To ensure the stakes for
our experimental subjects were sufficient, we also ran five High Stakes sessions in which we doubled
subjects’ cash endowments (2,400 francs) as well as the true asset values (100, 480, 980) from the
baseline. All other parameters in both robustness treatments were the same as the baseline. Average
prices per minute are displayed in Figure A1 in Appendix A. As is shown in Table 4, prices were not
significantly closer to the true asset value in either treatment than they were in the baseline. We report
MAD values per session in Table A2 in Appendix A. MAD values were higher in the Loan and High
Stakes treatments than in the baseline. This difference is significant when comparing the Loan
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treatment and the baseline (p-value = 0.032 for the last three transactions and for all transactions,
WRS) and fails to reach significance when comparing the High Stakes treatment and the baseline (pvalue = 0.806 for the last three transactions and p-value = 0.111 for all transactions, WRS). Similar
results are obtained with panel regressions (see Tables A5 and A6 in Appendix A). Given the tendency
of an influx of cash to boost prices in asset markets (Caginalp, Porter and Smith, 1998; 2001), it is not
surprising that the deviations from true asset value were even larger for our Loan treatment than for
our baseline sessions. Because the Loan and High Stakes treatments tend to produce even higher levels
of mispricing than the baseline, the differences between high-CRT sessions and all sessions involving
individuals with standard levels of CRT (i.e., baseline, Loan and High Stakes treatments) are highly
significant (see Tables A7 and A8 in Appendix A).
Our findings show that inducing common information regarding traders’ level of cognitive
sophistication is essential for information aggregation. To our knowledge, this result has never been
shown. In a related work, Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) study information aggregation in two-day
laboratory experiments in which subjects participated in the same experimental asset market with the
same traders on two consecutive days. In contrast to our setting, the authors consider the PS design in
which the asset value differs across traders. In that context, they show that common information
regarding payoffs is a necessary but not sufficient condition for information aggregation. They also
note that information aggregation requires conducting the same experiment on consecutive days with
the same subjects. Their study focuses on the common knowledge of payoffs leaving aside the issue
of the common knowledge of traders’ cognitive types. Thus, while related, their study is markedly
different from ours.22

22

Bringing subjects back the next day to participate in the same experiment with the same individuals can have many
different effects which are difficult to tease apart. Between the two sessions, subjects may search for information about
the experiment. Subjects may also share their experience with other subjects in the same session. This is especially the
case for their study as markets were conducted orally. Additionally, demand effects may arise as subjects are called for
a second day to do the exact same experiment as in the first day suggesting the experimenter may look for improved
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5. Conclusion
We tested two hypotheses regarding the impact of traders’ cognitive sophistication on the
informational efficiency of markets. First, a higher proportion of sophisticated traders in the market
should lead to prices that reflect the true asset value more closely. Second, prices will more closely
reflect the true asset value if it is common information that all traders populating the market are
sophisticated. The first hypothesis echoes the remark of Radner (1982) regarding the unrealistic
cognitive demands of rational expectation models, whereas the second hypothesis is reminiscent of
the work of Guesnerie (2005), which emphasizes the decisive role of common knowledge of
rationality in rational-expectation models.
We tested these hypotheses by recruiting sophisticated individuals defined as having scored in the
top 20% of all individuals in our subjects database on the CRT. Consistent with our first hypothesis,
we show that recruiting sophisticated individuals led to asset prices that more accurately reflected the
true asset value. In line with our second hypothesis, information aggregation was significantly
enhanced when the sophisticated traders populating the market were aware of each other’s high level
of sophistication. To our knowledge, this is the first time common information about traders’ cognitive
sophistication (measured using CRT scores) has been shown to improve the aggregation of private
information in markets. Our work implies that the informational efficiency of markets depends on
both the composition of the traders in the market as well as what is commonly known about this
composition.
Finally, our work extends previous market design research by exploring the cognitive constraints of
the aggregation of dispersed information instead of focusing on institutional and informational
features of markets. A natural step forward would be to incorporate cognitive constraints in the study

subjects’ performance. Finally, subjects may have time to reflect on the optimal strategy to adopt during the experiment.
In contrast to our design, none of these effects seem to induce common information of cognitive sophistication.
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of these features at both the empirical and theoretical levels. An interesting avenue of future research
could, for example, study information aggregation in the presence of complex assets (e.g., Carlin and
Manso, 2011; Carlin, Kogan and Lowery, 2013).
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7. Appendices

Appendix A. Tables and figures

Table A1. Distribution of 7-item CRT scores for the 885 students in the subject database who took the survey.
CRT score
% of students
0
12.77
1
19.32
2
18.42
3
14.01
4
13.33
5
9.83
6
7.23
7
5.08
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Table A2. Comparison of actual prices to true value at the end of each market.
Markets 14, 15 and 17 are considered.+
MAD values
Treatment

Session
1
2
3
4
5
Baseline
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
High CRT
(No common information)
13
14
15
16
High CRT
(Common Information)
17
18
19
Loan
20
21
22
High
23
Stakes
24
25
Baseline, Loan and High Stakes
average
High CRT average

All transactions
136.33
122.76
121.92
118.37
145.85
150.10
142.26
115.93
117.45
141.86
128.73
106.53
106.72
84.86
72.16
20.33
85.80
61.26
229.14
204.72
125.81
136.93
145.56
148.01
155.53

Last 3 transactions
124.78
132.33
66.89
84.56
96.67
134.00
122.78
140.33
120.22
135.22
127.33
99.56
81.22
52.22
47.00
2.00
57.78
6.33
237.78
215.56
104.22
127.56
137.56
110.56
127.72

144.62

130.51

83.30

59.18

+

To facilitate comparison across sessions, the MAD values for the High Stakes sessions have been divided
by two.
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Table A3. Mean absolute deviation comparison between baseline and high-CRT sessions with common information.
Dependent Variable

Sample (Market / Transactions)
Markets 14, 15 & 17
All transactions
(1)

Markets 14, 15 & 17
Last 3 transactions
(2)

All markets
All transactions
(3)

All markets
Last 3 transactions
(4)

Constant

-920.348***
(113.130)

-635.087***
(129.274)

92.264***
(15.638)

78.132***
(15.985)

Treatment Dummy
“CRT Common Information”23

-73.790***
(14.184)

-87.500***
(15.404)

-44.832***
(11.307)

-56.132***
(14.572)

True Asset Value

-0.218***
(0.056)

-0.149*
(0.078)

0.122***
(0.042)

0.102**
(0.049)

72.601***
(7.864)
42

51.504***
(9.004)
42

0.796
(0.716)
238

0.781
(0.778)
238

0.773
0.000

0.538
0.000

0.116
0.000

0.131
0.000

MAD

Market Number
Number of Observations
R²
Prob > χ²

The treatment dummy “CRT Common Information” takes value one if a market belongs to the high-CRT treatment with common information and value
zero otherwise.
23
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Table A4. Mean absolute deviation comparison between baseline and high-CRT sessions without common information.
Dependent Variable

Sample (Market / Transactions)
Markets 14, 15 & 17
All transactions
(1)

Markets 14, 15 & 17
Last 3 transactions
(2)

All markets
All transactions
(3)

All markets
Last 3 transactions
(4)

-1,077.057***
(68.996)

-819.362***
(91.594)

82.263***
(13.190)

66.574***
(14.449)

Treatment Dummy
“CRT No Common Information”24

-24.469**
(10.747)

-25.694
(16.751)

-19.823***
(7.162)

-16.717*
(10.564)

True Asset Value

-0.294***
(0.050)

-0.174**
(0.081)

0.119***
(0.042)

0.112**
(0.051)

Market Number

84.113***
(4.621)
42
0.818
0.000

63.934***
(6.643)
42
0.558
0.000

2.004***
(0.327)
238
0.093
0.000

1.757***
(0.478)
238
0.084
0.000

MAD
Constant

Number of Observations
R²
Prob > χ²

The treatment dummy “CRT No Common Information” takes value one if a market belongs to the high-CRT treatment without common information and
value zero otherwise.
24
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Table A5. Mean absolute deviation comparison between the baseline and the Loan treatment.
Dependent Variable

Sample (Market / Transactions)
Markets 14, 15 & 17
All transactions
(1)

Markets 14, 15 & 17
Last 3 transactions
(2)

All markets
All transactions
(3)

All markets
Last 3 transactions
(4)

Constant

-746.269***
(129.215)

-973.936***
(125.461)

80.013***
(20.110)

94.757***
(19.838)

Loan Treatment Dummy25

110.889***
(11.785)

81.198***
(11.247)

59.461***
(14.954)

33.624***
(12.392)

True Asset Value

-0.274**
(0.110)

-0.372***
(0.085)

-0.006
(0.099)

0.023
(0.093)

Market Number

60.870***
(8.223)
36
0.441
0.000

78.699***
(7.377)
36
0.569
0.000

3.638***
(1.181)
204
0.085
0.000

3.366***
(1.023)
204
0.055
0.000

MAD

Number of Observations
R²
Prob > χ²

25

This dummy variable takes value one for a session of the Loan treatment and value zero otherwise.
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Table A6. Mean absolute deviation comparison between the baseline and the High Stakes treatment.
Dependent Variable

Sample (Market / Transactions)
Markets 14, 15 & 17
All transactions
(1)

Markets 14, 15 & 17
Last 3 transactions
(2)

All markets
All transactions
(3)

All markets
Last 3 transactions
(4)

-936.252***
(83.400)

-1,152.629***
(58.456)

58.221***
(14.139)

75.409***
(13.882)

5.744
(9.870)

6.445
(5.917)

8.606
(7.776)

5.128
(6.191)

True Asset Value

-0.235***
(0.075)

-0.304***
(0.049)

0.140***
(0.052)

0.141***
(0.047)

Market Number

72.587***
(6.095)
45
0.626
0.000

89.199***
(3.979)
45
0.849
0.000

1.899***
(0.585)
255
0.105
0.000

2.128***
(0.280)
255
0.107
0.000

MAD
Constant

High Stakes Treatment Dummy26

Number of Observations
R²
Prob > χ²

26

This dummy variable takes value one for a session of the High Stakes treatment and value zero otherwise.

35

Table A7. Mean absolute deviation comparison between the baseline, the Loan treatment, the High Stakes treatment and highCRT sessions with common information.
Dependent Variable

Sample (Market / Transactions)
Markets 14, 15 & 17
All transactions
(1)

Markets 14, 15 & 17
Last 3 transactions
(2)

All markets
All transactions
(3)

All markets
Last 3 transactions
(4)

Constant

-913.865***
(100.238)

-692.337***
(111.988)

103.280***
(15.745)

90.592***
(17.066)

Treatment Dummy
“CRT Common Information”27

-85.238***
(15.119)

-102.235***
(16.436)

-50.296***
(11.293)

-65.659***
(14.394)

True Asset Value

-0.310***
(0.058)

-0.248***
(0.067)

0.062
(0.058)

0.055
(0.062)

Market Number

74.478***
(6.237)
63
0.589
0.000

57.864***
(7.242)
63
0.450
0.000

1.918**
(0.800)
357
0.079
0.000

1.792*
(0.943)
357
0.101
0.000

MAD

Number of Observations
R²
Prob > χ²

The treatment dummy “CRT Common Information” takes value one if a market belongs to the high-CRT treatment with common information and value
zero otherwise.
27

36

Table A8. Mean absolute deviation comparison between the baseline, the Loan treatment, the High Stakes treatment and highCRT sessions without common information.
Dependent Variable

Sample (Market / Transactions)
Markets 14, 15 & 17
All transactions
(1)

Markets 14, 15 & 17
Last 3 transactions
(2)

All markets
All transactions
(3)

All markets
Last 3 transactions
(4)

-1,018.337***
(82.991)

-815.187***
(92.175)

96.613***
(14.909)

82.886***
(16.579)

Treatment Dummy
“CRT No Common Information”28

-35.917***
(12.132)

-40.430**
(17.643)

-25.287***
(7.295)

-26.242**
(10.459)

True Asset Value

-0.361***
(0.052)

-0.264***
(0.068)

0.059
(0.057)

0.062
(0.063)

Market Number

82.153***
(4.674)
63
0.607
0.000

66.151***
(5.756)
63
0.425
0.000

2.723***
(0.625)
357
0.057
0.000

2.442***
(0.819)
357
0.054
0.000

MAD
Constant

Number of Observations
R²
Prob > χ²

The treatment dummy “CRT No Common Information” takes value one if a market belongs to the high-CRT treatment without common information and
value zero otherwise.
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Figure A1. Average prices per minute per market for the ten baseline (solid blue lines), two Loan (solid magenta lines with
triangle markers) and five High Stakes (dotted cyan lines with square markers) sessions. The true value is indicated by a solid
black horizontal line. For comparison purposes the prices from the High Stakes sessions have been divided by a factor of two.
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